Consider the example of a man contemplating the rape and murder of a woman. Finally, Hume thinks there is the dubiousness of the inference itself. Problems of Weak Analogy: As mentioned above, many of Philo’s objections can be classified as either a problem with the scope of the conclusion or as a weak analogy. Hume’s fourth consideration is also his most difficult: Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have wrought in any of these religions…as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. His arguments and objections often go unanswered, and he espouses many opinions on both religion and on other philosophical topics that Hume endorses in other works, such as the hypothesis that causal inference is based on custom. According to this theodicy, as advanced by Hick, God created the world as a good place, but no paradise, for developing morally and spiritually mature beings. Thus, the problem for Hume is not that the sectarians cannot interpret all purported miracles as their own but that they, in fact, do not. The emphasis on perceived divine selection is the hallmark of Hume’s “enthusiasm,” a view Hume saddled to many forms of Protestantism of his day. While some people experience and comprehend Ultimate Reality in personal, theistic categories (as Allah or Yahweh, to mention two), others do so in impersonal, pantheistic ways (as nirguna Brahman, for example). Tweyman ultimately argues that belief in a designer is natural for Hume. Hence, allowing that complex, purposive systems require a designing mind as their principle of order leads to an infinite regress of designing minds. If this is the case, however, then it becomes exceedingly difficult to discover the essence of such a notion a priori. But many theists maintain that some evils are not justified, that some horrors are so damaging that there are no goods which outweigh them. This was due largely to an ignorance of nature and a tendency to assign agency to things. In this way, Hume identifies four different forms of “false” or “vulgar” religion. Therefore, the universe has some kind of cause of its existence. Non-theistic religions have also offered accounts of evil, including its nature and existence, specifically with respect to suffering. The problem that arises has to do with locating the moral freedom in this system. To be persuaded of a miracle, we would need to be sure that no natural explanation, such as delusion, deception, and so forth, was more likely than the miraculous, a task which, for Hume, would simply take more credible witnesses than have ever attested to a miracle. There are various attempts to demonstrate what that good reason is, or those good reasons are. He argues that the world as it is, with its distribution of pains and pleasures, is more likely given what he calls a “hypothesis of indifference” than given theism. So in these instances, at least, the soul-making process would need to continue on in the afterlife. Therefore, the more reasons he can present, the better. Within every major religion is a belief about a transcendent reality underlying the natural, physical world. In the West, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics offered arguments for a directing intelligence of the world given the order found within it. The general editor of the series is Tom L. Beauchamp. In fact, in some cases, suffering seems to predictably diminish the sufferer. Second, again in opposition to the rationalist metaphysicians, he points out that dreamless sleep establishes that mental activity can be at least temporarily extinguished; we therefore have no reason to think that it cannot be permanently extinguished. Given the advances of science and the retreat of religious beliefs, many in the latter half of the twentieth century agreed with the general Freudian view that a new era was on the horizon in which the infantile illusions, or perhaps delusions, of religion would soon go the way of the ancient Greek and Roman gods. But God is nowhere to be found, whether one is in need or not. Hume states: It is the business of history to distinguish between the miraculous and the marvelous; to reject the first in all narrations merely profane and human; to doubt the second; and when obliged by unquestionable testimony…to admit of something extraordinary, to receive as little of it as is consistent with the known facts and circumstances. The cause of the universe is either an impersonal cause or a personal one. For the logical problem of evil, it is asserted that the two claims, (1) an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God exists, and (2) evil exists, are logically incompatible. Both Hume’s style and the fact of posthumous publication give rise to interpretive difficulties. Wieand is one of the few recent scholars that argues against Hume as Philo and for a Hume as Cleanthes/Pamphilus view. Laws, therefore, admit of no empirical counterexamples. But it does mean that religious differences are real and that there are intractable disagreements among religious traditions. If there is a personal, creator God who brought these two persons into the world, God seems to be unloving and unjust. However, the success of the arguments discussed above would largely undercut the adequacy of such reasons. If Hume did indeed think that Part I established that miracles could never occur, the entire second part, where he shows that “…there never was a miraculous event established on… [sufficient] evidence” (EHU 10.14), would be logically superfluous. When taken together, however, they provide his attempt at a systematic undermining of the justifications for religion. He therefore never grants a proof of a miracle as a real possibility, so the Caricature Argument may surmount at least this objection. Its most ardent defender has been John Hick. “Natural Belief and Enigma in Hume,”. There is, therefore, support for interpreting Hume as a deist of a limited sort. While Part I provides an argument against believing in miracles in general, Part II gives four specific considerations against miracles based on particular facts about the world. But without these interactions, there is little left for religion to strive toward. Nonetheless, once this is realized, we can strengthen Garrett’s point by recognizing that this role is, in fact, a necessary condition for testimony of a miracle. In this more recent work, he confronts some difficulties with the view and updates his position. With the Thomistic contingency argument, named after the medieval Christian theologian/philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), the claim is made that contingent things exist in the world—“contingent things” ostensibly referring to those entities which begin to exist and cease to exist and whose existence is dependent on another. Both sides, however, agree that the belief should not come from special revelation, such as miracles or revealed texts. It covers not only religious matters but thousands of ancillary topics as well, including folklore, myth, ritual, anthropology, psychology, etc. Pike therefore interprets these “irregular arguments” as non-inferential. The narrative of an originally perfect creation through which evil entered by the choices of free agents is now generally considered to be mistaken and unhelpful. So why not end with the universe? So no perfectly loving God exists (from 2 and 3). As Philo argues in Part V, since the experienced portion of the world is finite, then we cannot reasonably infer an infinite creator. Gratuitous evils appear to be in abundance. Some, like Gaskin, think that Hume’s objections to the design argument apply only to analogies drawn too strongly. Some non-realists have been highly critical of religion, such as Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Nelson Pike, in his own commentary on the Dialogues, roundly criticizes Kemp Smith’s position. Based on these dilemmas, the argument can be put in the following logical form: This version of the cosmological argument was bolstered by work in astrophysics and cosmology in the late twentieth century. Note that this is not as strange as it might first appear, because although cosmological arguments are now uniformly thought of as a posteriori rather than a priori, this was not the case in Hume’s day. Given this argument structure, we could also conclude that ghosts, gremlins, and countless other mythical creatures exist as well, which is absurd.
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